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# MONTHLY REVIEW

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## CONSEQUENCES OF GENEVA

THE EDITORS

## THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

POLITICAL ECONOMIST

## WORLD EVENTS

SCOTT NEARING

VOL. 6

5

*Two Views on the Witch Hunt*

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEETZ

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 EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

## NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The Sweezy case (see last month's issue, pp. 142-150) has been marking time during the past month. At the time of writing, the stenographic transcript of the three-day court hearing has just been completed, and the next step is the filing of a bill of exceptions preparatory to appealing the case to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Academic Freedom Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union has indicated its desire to enter the case as a "friend of the court," a development which we wholeheartedly welcome.

Let us remind you again of what most of you know, many through personal experience, that fighting these civil liberties cases is a very expensive business, and we are counting on your generous support. Last month we reopened our Anti-Inquisition Fund (first established when Leo Huberman de-

*(continued on inside back cover)*

## THE CONSEQUENCES OF GENEVA

The Geneva settlement of the Indo-China War was a genuine compromise which, assuming good will and good sense on both sides, can bring great benefits to everyone concerned. This is obvious enough as far as the Vietnamese are concerned. Not only do they get peace after eight years of the cruelest kind of war; in addition, they are promised the unity of their country in terms which it would be hard for the French to circumvent even if they should be so foolish as to try.

## Geneva and France

What is not so obvious, partly because it has been deliberately obscured by Washington's official and unofficial spokesmen, is that the French got much more out of the Geneva Conference than they had any right to expect. Though badly defeated militarily, they are not being chased out of the country. Rather they are being given plenty of time to withdraw in good order and with all their equipment, much as the British withdrew from India seven years ago. And even more important, Ho Chi Minh's government has made it plain that it wants close relations with France in the future. There are intimate cultural and commercial ties between the two countries which can obviously be developed to the great advantage of both, once the French finally abandon the obsolete idea of keeping Indo-China as a colony. The Geneva settlement keeps the door wide open to such mutually profitable cooperation in the years to come. As two well-informed French observers at Geneva put it:

It [the accord] not only puts an end to the war, though that is its most spectacular consequence, but it constitutes above all . . . a political settlement in the sense that it opens up entirely new perspectives in the relations between French and Vietnam, between the metropolis and what is no longer a French colony. It is the first "experience" of this kind in French his-

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tory. . . (Hector de Galard and Roger Stephane, "Les Lendemain de la Paix Indochinoise," *France-Observateur*, July 22, 1954, p. 6.)

The cynics, of course, will tell us that it is nonsensical to suppose that the French can cooperate with "the Communists." But the cynics, as usual, are wrong. The Ho Chi Minh regime is Vietnamese as well as (preponderantly) Communist; a strong French connection can help to keep it from becoming too dependent on Russia and China; and Vietnam will have the same need to engage in trade with the industrially advanced countries of the West that the other socialist-bloc countries are already trying so hard to satisfy. For France, the opportunity is clearly there, and it is within her own power to decide whether she makes much or little of it.

The chance to develop mutually beneficial relations with a free Vietnam, however, is not the only, and assuredly not the greatest, gain that France derives from the Geneva settlement. By the very act of signing the Geneva accords, France acquired once again the independence to choose her own course in domestic and international affairs that a series of pusillanimous governments had frittered and sold away during the last eight years. The analogy that irresistibly comes to mind is that of unlocking doors: a nation long immured can now escape into the open and explore alternatives which had previously seemed nonexistent. The days of what the French themselves call *immobilisme* are over. As a result of Geneva, France is once again master of her own fate.

How much this means to a country no one should be better able to judge than we Americans. Those of us who are old enough to have lived through the Great Depression will never forget the sense of release and exhilaration that swept the country when the Roosevelt government took over in March, 1933, and, like the Mendès-France government in June of this year, made unmistakably clear its break with the do-nothing policies of its predecessor. From our own experience we know what the French people have been going through during the last exciting two months. And, alas, from our own experience of nearly a decade of cold war in which our government's foreign policies have met defeat after defeat, while the world's once-full reservoir of good will for us has been drained to the bottom—from this bitter experience, we know all too well what the French people had to go through in the months and years leading up to June 1954. We should be the first to congratulate the French on their good fortune, and we should now look forward all the more eagerly to the time when we shall once again know the thrill of those March days of more than two decades ago.

It may perhaps be thought that we are running ahead of events

and jumping to conclusions, that a more reserved attitude would be safer. After all, the "Mendès-France experiment" has hardly begun and may easily founder on the rocks ahead. Making peace in Indo-China and offering autonomy to Tunisia—its two substantial achievements up to the time of writing—were essentially negative acts, cancelling some of the evil inheritance of the past. Compared to the formidable tasks which have yet to be faced, they were essentially simple and aroused relatively mild opposition. It will be very different when it comes to reforming the French economy and working out a new European policy to replace the EDC and all that it implies. What guarantee is there that Mendès-France will be as successful in solving these problems as he was in making peace in Indo-China?

There is none, of course, and it would be hard to overestimate the obstacles which lie in the path of success. Genuine economic reform—the only kind that matters—will trench on deeply vested interests not only of French Big Business but also of the petty bourgeoisie, the very strata which provide the cabinet with its present membership. And embarking upon a new European policy necessarily entails the risk of losing American aid and breaking up the Western Alliance in its present form, eventualities which greatly alarm almost the whole French Center and Right. Mendès-France's personal popularity and prestige are enormous at the present time—of this the evidence is overwhelming—but they hardly provide a secure political base for a program of far-reaching changes in both domestic and foreign affairs; and Mendès-France may be unable or unwilling to extend his government to the Left as he would have to in order to assure himself of solid support from the working class. There is no way to avoid the conclusion that he may fail, and in the relatively near future too.

But we think that those, in and out of Washington, are deceiving themselves who count on a relapse of France into the *status quo ante*. A process has been started which will not be easily stopped, a flood has been released which will not soon be dammed. Any attempt to go back now, it seems to us, would be doomed to failure, no matter under whose leadership it might be undertaken. For our part, we doubt that the vested interests will be able to prevent France from taking the economic measures necessary to make her new-found independence real and lasting, or that the country will accept a policy toward Germany (and the rest of Europe) which every Frenchman knows in his heart of hearts would be fatal to the French nation. The logic of the situation runs from Right to Left, and Mendès-France has shown that he knows it by repeated efforts to bring the Socialist Party into his government. He may yet end up, in spite of himself, as the Premier of a Popular Front government.

But even if Mendès-France is unable or unwilling to follow the political logic of the situation in which he finds himself, the outcome is unlikely to be a return to the unlamented regime of the Laniel and Bidaults. It is more likely to be a period of severe social conflicts which might even reach the intensity of civil war. We can be pretty certain, in other words, that for France Geneva marked the end of one era and the beginning of another, even if we cannot yet know what the new era holds in store.

### Geneva and Europe

It is, of course, obvious that the process of change set in motion by Geneva affects a great deal more than Vietnam and France. The whole structure of international relations has been profoundly shaken, and the consequences are likely to be far-reaching indeed.

In this connection, it seems to us, the crux of the matter is the discovery by everyone—East and West alike—that great international issues can be settled without and even against the United States. The entire picture of a world of two superpowers surrounded by their clients and satellites, which has become so deeply imbedded in our minds in the years since World War II, was suddenly transcended and rendered obsolete at Geneva. When Mr. Dulles left Geneva early in the Conference, his purpose, almost certainly, was to prove to the participants and to the world at large that nothing could be accomplished or decided in the absence of the United States. He succeeded in proving the exact opposite, and it is this which lies at the heart of the overwhelming diplomatic defeat suffered by Washington. When Mr. Dulles had departed, everyone could see that there were four major powers left and that they were prepared to negotiate and compromise the problems before them. Their success in reaching agreement on Indo-China is bound to have the effect of reopening all the major international issues which the world had fatalistically come to regard as non-negotiable and insoluble.

The most urgent of these issues, by common consent of everyone concerned, is Germany. If a settlement could be negotiated in Indo-China, why can't one be negotiated in Germany? Or, to put the matter in the words of a European, Léo Hamon, a French Senator and a member of the same party as ex-Foreign Minister Georges Bidault:

The conditions under which the Geneva agreement was concluded allow us to hope for renewed successes by the method of negotiation. The matter has yet to be put to the test. The general fear of an increase in international tension, with its unpredictable consequences, is the reason for the East's concessions. If the Western powers, and specially those closest to Germany,

want a solution which will restore equilibrium to Germany, as it has already been restored to Indo-China, why should it not be possible to arrive at one? (*France-Observateur*, July 29, 1954, p. 9.)

The question is obvious, simple, and overwhelmingly important to all Europeans. After Geneva, nothing the United States can say or do, short of open armed intervention, can prevent the question from being answered.

No one can say for sure that the answer will be yes, but it is not only the success of Geneva that gives cause for optimism. The mounting uneasiness in Washington and Bonn suggests that Dulles and Adenauer are far from confident of their ability to torpedo renewed negotiations on Germany.

And if the answer is yes, if the fears of Dulles and Adenauer are justified, if Germany is reunited within the framework of a European security system, then unquestionably the world will have taken the longest step yet toward the establishment of lasting peace and international sanity.

## Geneva and the United States

When we turn to the impact of Geneva on the United States, we see a picture which, while not altogether dark, is certainly sombre and depressing. Dulles has suffered the greatest diplomatic defeat of his career, and yet he remains Secretary of State, his position apparently as secure as ever. Admiral Radford's military advice has been decisively rejected, and yet no voice is raised to protest against his remaining the government's top military adviser. The possibility and fruitfulness of negotiating with the new China have just been convincingly demonstrated, and yet all government officials, elected and appointed, from the President down, go out of their way to denounce the Chinese government and to avow their fervent hostility to recognizing its existence. The hope of a peaceful settlement of the German problem, one of the main causes of two world wars, has been raised higher than at any time since 1945, and yet the American government's only reaction is to redouble its efforts to organize a military bloc around an unregenerate West Germany in which the Nazi influence is already strong and rapidly growing.

At first sight, it doesn't seem to make sense, this apparent imperviousness of the United States to a great historic event which threatens to revolutionize the country's international position and which has so deeply affected most of the rest of the world. And yet if we look more closely, we shall see that what has happened since Geneva is consistent with a pattern of events which is, or should be, quite familiar from our experience of the last few years.

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The thing to stress is that the Dulles-Nixon-Radford-Knowland effort to get the United States involved in Indo-China was essentially a repeat performance of the MacArthur affair of 1951. The aim in both cases was to get us into a war with China for the ultimate purpose of destroying the Communist regime and reintegrating China into the American sphere of influence. Both efforts failed because those who had to make the final decisions had no confidence in the possibility of military victory. For all the obvious differences, the role of Eisenhower in the recent crisis duplicated in substance the role of Truman in 1951.

This division between the war party and what may be called, for lack of a better designation, the party of caution has run like a red thread through recent American history and is probably the most important fact of our political life today. We should do our best to understand its nature.

It is *not* a split between Republicans and Democrats. The role of Eisenhower in the Indo-China crisis is sufficient proof of that. Nor is it a split between the right wing of the Republican Party on the one hand and the rest of the Republicans plus the Democrats on the other. To convince oneself of this, one need only read the record of the very illuminating debate on defense and foreign policies which took place in the Senate on July 21st, the day after the signing of the Indo-China armistice. In this debate, it was Senator Symington of Missouri, formerly Secretary of the Air Force under Truman and more recently prominently mentioned as a possible Democratic presidential candidate, who carried the ball for the war party, with assists from Democratic Senator Jackson of Washington and to the applause of Senator Knowland. It was Republican Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts who defended the relatively cautious policies of the administration, with no help at all from the Democrats. It is indeed a sobering experience to read the Gallagher-Shean act put on by the Senators from Missouri and California, of which the following is a fair sample:

*Senator Knowland:* . . . I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Missouri if he does not believe that the policy which has been enunciated abroad of peaceful coexistence with ruthless and aggressive Communism is not comparable to the situation of an individual who has been put into a cage with a vicious tiger which has just been well fed and is digesting a big meal, but, when he digests his meal, which in this case is a big piece of Indo-China, he will then seek the next source of his meat, which will be the unfortunate individual who is trying to coexist with him in the tiger's cage?

*Senator Symington:* I could not agree more heartily with the Senator. . . .



The truth is that there is no simple way of describing either the war party or the party of caution, and unfortunately no one in a position to gather the facts necessary for a close analysis of the split has seen fit to do so. It may nevertheless be helpful to note some of the most important and obvious components of the two groups.

*War party:* Most of the right wing of the GOP, including especially the China Lobby and its stable of Senators and Representatives; the Air Force and its lobby (this is apparently the category to which Symington belongs); a large part of the Navy, particularly the "flying admirals"; the veterans' organizations and other patriotic societies and the fascist (McCarthyite) wing of the Catholic Church (this category overlaps the others but is by no means included in them); and finally those capitalists who are most directly and heavily dependent on arms spending, plus, of course, the political representatives of the regions where their operations are centered (this category undoubtedly includes a number of Southern and Western Congressmen whose belligerence at first sight seems so paradoxical).

*Party of caution:* The largest part of the Republican Party, based on Big Business and the aristocracy of inherited wealth (with surprisingly few exceptions, the personnel of the Eisenhower administration is drawn from this social group); the Army which is acutely conscious of the fact that in terms of ground forces the United States is overwhelmingly outclassed by the USSR and China; and many (though by no means all) of the more liberal Democrats who are intelligent enough to understand the frightful risks of war and are capable of taking a broader and longer-run view of things than their reactionary colleagues (men like Herbert Lehman and Chester Bowles may be taken as representative of this group: both are Big Businessmen in their own right).

It is significant that genuinely popular or mass organizations do not figure in either the war party or the party of caution. It would, of course, be quite possible to quote individual labor, farmer, or Negro leaders on one side or the other. To a certain extent, such evidence, being mutually contradictory, cancels itself out. But what is specially characteristic of the last few years is that the mass organizations have deliberately refrained from taking any initiative in the entire field of foreign policy, and we know of no evidence that they have played a special role one way or the other in the periods of crisis when crucial decisions on war or peace were being taken. They have dutifully echoed official ideology and for the rest have left the conduct of military and diplomatic affairs to the supposed experts.

What this means is that the split between the war party and the party of caution has been exclusively a ruling-class affair and has never reflected divergent views of America's national interests

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and aspirations. The whole ruling class, with negligible exceptions, shares the twin aims of American world domination and the extermination of socialism, both given ideological expression in the anti-Communist crusade. Differences relate solely to questions of tactics and timing. This was demonstrated in the clearest possible manner in the MacArthur hearings in 1951 (see "The Meaning of MacArthur," MR, June 1951, especially pp. 39-44), and nothing that has happened during or since the Indo-China crisis indicates that there has been any significant change in this respect.\*

As long as the split in the ruling class is entirely a matter of "how and when," it can produce nothing but mutual frustration. It is a sterile dispute—generates no new ideas, calls forth no creative energies, poses neither new problems nor suggests new solutions to old problems. The outcome of the Indo-China crisis in this country provides a perfect illustration of this truth. There is a general sense of relief that it is over and we have escaped war, at least for the moment. But at the same time, nerves are frayed and everywhere one finds a pervasive feeling that absolutely nothing has been settled. That Dulles and Radford remain in office merely symbolizes and emphasizes the fact that, unlike the rest of the world, we are back where we were before the crisis came to a head at Geneva and Dienbienphu.

This is without doubt the most ominous aspect of the present situation. As long as the main conflict in the United States is over the issue of whether to go to war or not, there is always the chance that the war party will have its way. It matters little that the chance of the United States' winning a war is already very small and getting smaller everyday: the war party knows this as well as anyone, as a reading of Senator Symington's speech in the Senate debate of July 21st shows.\*\* What matters is that the American ruling class is unable to see the world's problems *except* in terms of war, and that a large and influential part is perfectly willing to have said of it what was said of Samson (*Judges*, XVI, 30): "So the dead which he slew at his death were more than they which he slew in his life."

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\* We do not want to deny, incidentally, that *sufficiently large* differences over tactics and timing become in effect differences over ultimate aims. The point is that differences in the American ruling class have not yet reached this crucial point where quantity changes into quality.

\*\* "Soon there will be sufficient weapons, of sufficient power," the former Secretary of the Air Force said, "to destroy any and all targets which could possibly threaten either ourselves or our allies. . . . Soon the Communists will amass a stockpile of these cheap packages of absolute destruction large enough to blacken with atomic fire not just our cities and industries but every square mile of American landscape. Unlimited hydrogen destructive capacity is therefore with us."

Geneva was a great victory for world peace. It broke the paralyzing mold of eight long years of hot and cold wars. It set the world to thinking along new lines and to exploring new roads to a better future. But the victory will never be secure until there is a decisive change in the United States—until the overriding issue here is not whether to go to war, but how to live in peace.

We are confident that this change will take place, sooner or later, in one way or another. But we do not believe that it will happen until the American working class once again steps on the political stage in its own right and fights for its interests, which are the real interests of the country, as resolutely and courageously as it did in the heyday of the New Deal. For peaceful coexistence—expressed in Roosevelt's day in the policies of the Good Neighbor, recognition of the Soviet Union, and the Russo-American alliance against Hitlerism—corresponds as surely to the interests of the working class as cold and hot wars correspond to the interests of the capitalist class.

## AMERICA'S NEWEST ALLY

Pakistan, America's newest military ally, has been much in the news of late. An election in East Pakistan last spring resulted in an overwhelming defeat of the government party, the Moslem League, which has governed Pakistan since it split off from India in 1947. Shortly thereafter, labor troubles in some of East Pakistan's largest jute mills resulted in many hundreds of deaths and provided the central government with a pretext for disbanding the newly elected provincial government and substituting direct military rule. The Communists, according to government spokesmen, had been fomenting disorder, and the East Pakistan regime had abdicated its responsibilities. Soon afterwards, the Communist Party was banned throughout Pakistan and scores of leftists, both Communist and non-Communist, were rounded up and thrown into jail.

So much one can learn from the American press — along with the hardly surprising information that Washington approves of Pakistan's tough attitude towards the Left, and indeed considers it to be no more than a logical corollary of the United States-Pakistan military alliance. But what has really been going on in Pakistan? What is the hidden story behind the sensational headlines?

These are not easy questions to answer, and certainly there is little help to be had from the United States press. It was therefore

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with the greatest interest that we recently met a specialist on South Asia who has travelled widely in that region in recent years and is thoroughly familiar with what has been going on behind the scenes in Pakistan. We questioned him closely and took copious notes on his answers. From these notes, we reconstruct the following story which we feel sure will be of interest to MR readers.

Pakistan is a bifurcate nation, the two parts of which are separated by nearly a thousand miles of Indian territory. West Pakistan is made up of West Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, and Sind. No Hindus remain here. The spoken languages are Urdu, Pushtu, and Sindhi. All are written in Urdu script which runs from right to left, Perso-Arabic style.

West Pakistan controls the country, both West and East, and within West Pakistan power is centered in the Punjab with its capital at Lahore. Leadership is recruited mostly from among Punjabi landlords and other Moslem landlords who left India at the time of the separation in 1947 (especially from what used to be called the United Provinces of northern India). For all practical purposes, there isn't an honest politician in Pakistan. All of them are hopelessly corrupt sons of landlords—scheming, treacherous, emotional. They are out to make as much money as they can while they can. Their motto might well be *après nous, le déluge*. The arms deal with the United States shows that they have powerful outside support, and they doubtless count on making money out of it too (contracts for supplies and installations, and so on).

East Pakistan is a horse of another color. It consists of the eastern part of what used to be the united Indian province of Bengal and contains more than half of the total population of Pakistan. Its inhabitants speak Bengali and (to the extent that they are literate) write in Bengali script which runs from left to right like Sanskrit and Hindi. They are proud of their language and script and hate Urdu. Three-quarters of the East Bengalis are Moslem, and at the height of the wave of anti-Hindu and anti-Indian feeling in 1946-1947, they decided to join up with their co-religionists in Pakistan.

Since the partition of 1947, the Bengalis have discovered to their dismay and sorrow that East Pakistan has been no more than a colony of West Pakistan. All the good jobs have gone to non-Bengalis (Punjabis, former United Provinces Moslems, and so on). The capital invested in the jute mills (East Pakistan's biggest industry) has come from West Pakistan. Karachi (capital of West Pakistan) has tried hard to impose Urdu on the Bengalis. The result of these West Pakistan policies has been to build up a fierce resentment among the Bengalis which burst out in the provincial elections held in East Pakistan last March.

The chief opposition to the Moslem League took the form of a United Front of non-League Moslems, Hindus (about one-quarter of the population of East Pakistan), the left-wing groups (a small minority of the United Front as a whole). Of the 309 seats in the provincial assembly, the United Front captured 237, while the Moslem League won only nine. A more crushing electoral defeat for the governing party would be hard to imagine.

Enthusiasm among the students of East Pakistan was one of the important factors in the size of the United Front's victory, and the popular basis for a strong and progressive provincial government seemed to have been laid. But the top leaders of the United Front, including the prime minister of the new provincial regime, Fazlul Huq, were politicians of the old school, mutually antagonistic, corrupt, scheming, disgusting. They talked much and did little. Meanwhile, the government at Karachi carefully planned its counterblow.

On May 30th, without any prior warning, Karachi struck. General Mirza, former Minister of Defense, was sent to East Pakistan to replace the provincial governor. He immediately dismissed the Huq cabinet, arrested hundreds of opponents of the Moslem League, and clamped on a regime of naked military force. Elaborate precautions had been taken against the eventuality of resistance, but none materialized.

Informed quarters tell the following story about the circumstances leading up to the military coup.

The owners of the big jute mills at Narayanganj (the river port a few miles below Dacca, capital of East Pakistan) are West Pakistanis, probably mostly Punjabis. The management is 99 percent non-Bengali. Labor is of two kinds: (1) non-Bengali Moslems who migrated to East Bengal after partition, and (2) Bengali Moslems. Differential wage rates prevail between the two groups, the non-Bengalis getting the higher rates. To avoid trouble, there are two different pay days. (This general ownership-management-labor pattern is common in East Pakistan today). Understandably, the Bengali workers are furious, and it was they, along with the students at Dacca University, who were at the heart of the United Front's electoral victory.

The Punjabi capitalists, determined to teach the Bengali workers a lesson, began at the remotely situated Chittagong paper mill on the Karnaphuli River. Here the management arranged to have 50 or 60 of the Bengali Moslem workers killed, just to show them their place.

A more circumspect procedure was necessary at Narayanganj, which is close to Dacca. So the management waited first for the Dacca University students to disperse for the summer to their various

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villages and towns. Then they got ready. As of May 15, the morning of the great killings, all the *non*-Bengali Moslems were instructed to fly small black flags on their homes and to wear black armbands. In the know about this were the main police and civil officials of the region as well as the owners and managers of the mills—all of them, be it noted, Punjabis. Of the rioting that followed, a New Delhi dispatch of May 20th to the *Free Press Journal* (Bombay) said:

Its pre-planned nature becomes clear from the promptitude and thoroughness of its execution.

Within about two hours, three entire villages [inhabited largely by Bengali Moslems] near the Adamjee jute mills in Narayanganj, were burnt down and almost the entire population massacred. The death roll is stated to have touched the 1000 mark, and, despite the official figures, Pakistan newspapers stated that over 600 had been killed.

This was the incident that was used as a pretext for overthrowing the United Front government. Karachi charged—absurdly—that the riots were the work of Communists and blamed Fazlul Huq and his colleagues for failing to maintain law and order. In this way, the West Pakistan ruling class combined a savage act of class war with a bold campaign of political aggression against the East Pakistan government.

Two weeks after the Narayanganj riots, General Mirza took over and put Huq under house arrest. He has been there ever since, translating the Koran into English for the 99th time to keep himself busy.

Meanwhile the Moslem League government in Karachi continues in business as usual. What kind of government is it?

Its basis is an all-Pakistan legislature which also is acting as Constituent Assembly to draw up a constitution for Pakistan. These legislator-delegates were not elected to their position: they were *appointed* by old state legislatures of undivided India which had been elected in 1946. There has *never* been a nation-wide election in Pakistan.

By all canons of political reason and logic, the new East Bengal legislature, whose members were chosen in the election of last March, should now have had the right to send new delegates to the central assembly, and in fact Fazlul Huq was pressing this demand. At the same time, the opposition in West Pakistan was demanding elections at the state level there. Such elections would hardly have been as disastrous for the League as were those of East Bengal, but still they would probably have resulted in some losses for the League. Taking account of the fact that East Bengal has more than half of Pakistan's total population, it is easy to see that the Moslem League Government was faced with a mortal threat to its very existence.

## REVIEW OF THE MONTH

Something had to be done, and something was done. Some thousand workers were murdered in cold blood, a Communist threat was invented, and the East Bengal government was overthrown for failing to deal with the imaginary red menace. Thus was democracy saved—with the publicly expressed blessing of Horace Hiltreth, United States Ambassador to Pakistan. Thus does the "free world" win its glorious victories!

(August 9, 1954)

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The author of the following letter to the editor of the *New York Times* (August 16, 1954) is the eminent drama critic of that paper:

*We can vote in this country. This is doubtless the principal source of our liberty. There is freedom of speech for citizens willing to take the consequences.*

*In many respects, however, both the administrative and legislative branches of the Government show a compulsion toward totalitarian attitudes and practices:*

*The Government refuses passports to citizens it does not like.*

*It blocks the free exchange of ideas by denying visas to eminent European scientists and writers who have been invited by American citizens to attend professional conferences here.*

*It has repudiated the scientist who led the world in the construction of the atom bomb because he is not a standardized man.*

*It maintains an organization of investigators who collect, among other items, facts concerning the newspaper reading habits of citizens and the mail that goes into their homes.*

*It employs political informers.*

*It blackmails citizens into informing on each other.*

*It summons citizens before Government committees to answer for their personal ideas, associations, friends and their relatives.*

*Government committees presume to give absolution to citizens who confess their political sins and promise not to violate the committees' party line in the future.*

*The Government has permitted a Senator to set himself up as public prosecutor.*

*It has accused the national foundations of underwriting revolution, threatened them with tax reprisals and denied them equal rights to defend themselves.*

*It sacks or rusticates foreign service officers who do not parrot the party line at home.*

*It tries to consolidate itself in power by denouncing its predecessors in office as traitors.*

*I wonder if Americans really want it this way.*

—Brooks Atkinson

## THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

BY POLITICAL ECONOMIST

The Anglo-American Alliance has been the cornerstone of British foreign policy for the last decade and a half. Abroad, it has involved growing British subordination to Washington to the point where British initiative and freedom of maneuver have been drastically curtailed though not yet eliminated. At home, the expanded armaments program which is the inescapable corollary of the Alliance has imposed a double burden on the already overloaded British economy, since it entails the diversion of nearly a million able-bodied young men from the labor market in the midst of a full-employment situation, and at the same time absorbs 12 percent of the national income. British industrial production is now around 50 percent and the *volume* of exports around 70 percent above prewar levels. And yet, largely (though not only) because of rearmament, per capita consumption in the relatively prosperous year 1953 was barely above 1937, and the ratio of gross investment to gross national product has consistently been well below that of the United States and Germany, Britain's two main commercial rivals—which, of course, means that Britain's long-run international competitive position is being seriously weakened. It is all the more ironic that rearmament makes no sense even on its own premises of an eventual American war against Russia, one of the first results of which would be Britain's annihilation.

Nevertheless, until the Indo-China crisis the Alliance was accepted by both major parties with few reservations, despite certain strains arising first from the acceleration of the American drive to war and second, and overlapping with the first, from Anglo-American imperialist contradictions. The specific outcome of the Indo-China crisis, which came as such a shock to the Alsops and many of their journalistic colleagues in the United States, is intelligible only against the background of a rapid growth both in popular anti-American feeling and in the acuteness of the tensions between American and British ruling circles. The former, which dates from at least the time when MacArthur clumsily tried to involve the West in an all-out war with China, is based primarily on the simple desire for peace and the resulting resentment against American warmongering, and secondarily on a healthy response to the official and unofficial Mc-

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Carthyism which pro-American apologists have a harder and harder time dismissing as a passing aberration. While the British people may not be politically the most sophisticated in the world, they cannot be fooled on the organic connection between the internal hysteria in the United States and the drive to war. The H-bomb tests immeasurably enhanced the anti-American current. For once, not even the professional military strategists and commentators, whose invincible stupidity appears to be an occupational disease, could avoid the conclusion that an H-bomb war would spell the end for Britain as a world power and indeed as any power at all.

Most Americans are just not aware of the depth of anti-American feeling here. It comes out at many levels and on many issues, small as well as large, and is reflected on the radio, in the daily press, and in casual conversations with the man in the street, not to mention the intellectual. The American armed forces, which were welcomed in World War II, are now regarded as interlopers with many of the characteristics of a *Herrenvolk*. The following incident, trivial enough in itself, may be illuminating in this context: a rumpus was raised in the House of Commons because the first sign greeting the Russian student exchange delegation as it landed at the Bovingdon Airport was, "The United States Air Force welcomes you to Britain." The sign has now been removed.

This anti-American sentiment, while still vague and undifferentiated, is beginning to take on a more explicit political tone. This was manifest in the Cort case no less than in the *general* reaction to Guatemala. The usually fawningly pro-American Liberal Party joined in the widespread protests against the Home Secretary's refusal of political asylum to Dr. Cort—a refusal due as much to American pressures, which everyone takes for granted in spite of Home Secretary Maxwell-Fyfe's formal denials, as to Tory reluctance publicly to admit that there is something rotten in the state of American democracy. As for Guatemala, anti-Americanism found a most unexpected outlet in *Punch*,\* the humorous weekly which reflects the ideology of the British aristocracy and squirearchy just

\* A detailed study of the British press's treatment of Guatemala and the Cort case would be most revealing; opinion analysts please note. The unmistakably Tory and pro-American Sunday *Observer* published several columns of correspondence, which were admittedly only a selection, almost all in favor of granting Cort political asylum. And in its first editorial on Guatemala the no less pro-American *Manchester Guardian* gloated that the United States was no longer in a position to read its junior partner lectures on the evils of colonialism. Such developments are the more striking in view of the fact that, with very few exceptions, the British press falls far below the French in its level of candor and generally imposes on itself a voluntary if by no means ineffectual censorship on matters the ruling class prefers not to have aired.

as the *New Yorker* does that of the American rentier. In its leading cartoon of June 30, entitled (in Spanish) "Statue of Liberation," Liberty, with United Fruit inscribed across her brow, is shown holding aloft a stem of bananas. The conception if not the execution was worthy of a Daumier.

The intra-imperialist conflicts have become increasingly apparent. American finance capital is pushing its British rival to adopt sterling convertibility faster than the latter is prepared to go. The *deliberalization* of American commercial policy, which the Eisenhower administration characteristically calls by its opposite, is rousing more and more concern in official circles. The Randall Committee's attitude to stabilization schemes for commodities controlled by the City of London stands in marked contrast to American attempts to bolster the prices of wheat and cotton in the capitalist world market. Leading British manufacturing organizations, not to mention trade unions, are becoming increasingly restless about American restrictions on British trade with the socialist bloc in general and with China in particular. No one can satisfactorily explain to the North British Locomotive Company, the largest exporter of steam locomotives in the world, why it should have to contract its activities and employment at a time when China has indicated willingness to place orders for 500 locomotives over a period of five years.

British oil interests are unhappy, to say the least, about the concessions they have had to make not only to an Iranian government which is clearly an American puppet (in the words of Vice President Nixon, "the American people have taken General Zahedi to their hearts," though actually, of course, the American people had never heard of Zahedi, a notorious Nazi agent, drug addict, and degenerate, before the State Department's *coup*) but also to their more powerful American competitors. And now Egypt. The evacuation of Suez is the crowning insult to the die-hard wing of British imperialism, which cannot reconcile itself to being brutally displaced by its trans-Atlantic rival. The Tory dissident, Legge-Bourke, could not contain himself in his speech in the House of Commons debate on foreign affairs on July 14:

On this Egyptian issue it is very stupid of all of us and very stupid of the Americans to disguise the fact that Mr. Caffery in Cairo has not been at all helpful to British interests [as if that were his job!]. We are merely putting our heads in the sand if we pretend that he has, or if we do not tell the Americans what we think. In fact, *he has continually undermined our case for remaining in Egypt at all.*" (Emphasis added.)

And another dissident, Captain Waterhouse, after describing the Egyptian agreement not as a sellout but as a giveaway, beautifully

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if unconsciously summed up the dialectical connection between Britain's dependence on the Anglo-American Alliance for its survival as an imperialist power on the one hand, and the Anglo-American imperialist antagonisms on the other, in the following statement in the House debate on Egypt on July 29:

We needed a close friendship with the United States more than anything else in the world, but the House had to realize that the United States disliked the British Empire. Their actions throughout the world seemed to be motivated by a dislike for the Empire and an anxiety to do it injuries, both small and great.

The dilemma to which Captain Waterhouse was calling attention is crucial to an understanding of future political and diplomatic trends.

The Indo-China crisis brought about the first *open and official* cleavage in the Anglo-American Alliance. There have been cleavages, and serious cleavages, before, but external harmony had invariably been preserved. This time, while all the appropriate ceremonies, from the now traditional trip to Washington down to the issue of the vacuous scrap of paper, have been publicly performed, no one and least of all the main protagonists pretends that the basic differences have been resolved. "Gangrene cannot be cured with lavender water."

It is no coincidence that the immediate cause of the cleavage was identical with that of 1950-1951. Again America desperately tried to entangle the West in a showdown with China, and again its allies, as distinct from puppets and satellites, did not want to be led to the slaughter. But whereas they allowed themselves to be inveigled into the Korean hostilities in 1950 and only barely managed to prevent their systematic extension to China, this time Churchill and Eden flatly refused to be dragged into the Indo-China conflict until the possibilities of negotiation on reasonable, as opposed to dictated, terms had been exhausted. Moreover, once Bidault, who Dulles himself admitted did not reflect the will of the French people, had been fired, Mendès-France insisted on negotiating a compromise settlement. In the event, American diplomacy suffered its most resounding defeat in years. For the first time, Washington's most dependable European allies—West Germany can never be dependable in view of its proximity to Russia and the ever-present possibility of a Rapallo—resisted sustained American pressure and successfully implemented a policy diametrically opposed to that of Dulles in an area of major American political and military strategic interest.

What is more, as the Indo-China crisis unfolded, the issue was both extended and sharpened. Beginning as a difference on Far Eastern policy, it now embraces the fundamental question of the

possibility of peaceful co-existence with the whole socialist bloc.

What are the causes of this remarkable shift? Let us try to isolate two or three of the most important.

First, the whole British and French peoples want a relaxation of international tensions and peaceful co-existence.

Second, the British ruling class and a growing section of the French, too, are becoming increasingly aware that as far as they are concerned the only alternative to peaceful co-existence is non-existence. Churchill can derive no consolation from the contemplation of the prospect of "victorious ruins," whatever they may mean. Hence his remarkable amnesia with respect to the genesis of the concept of peaceful co-existence and his attempt to legitimize it by ascribing its paternity to Anthony Eden. Hence his alarm at the systematic American policy, now by intransigence at the conference table, now by wild threats, and most recently of all by aircraft-carrier diplomacy, of keeping alive and if possible generalizing local wars. Hence also his attempt to call a halt to the process. It is ridiculous to think for one moment that the dominant group in Britain is anything but anti-Soviet and anti-New China. Because of its class and imperialist interests it cannot be anything else, and it is a sad commentary on the state of affairs in America that Churchill had to remind his Washington audience that he had tried and failed to strangle the infant Soviet Republic at birth. At the same time, partly through greater experience and partly because of its greater vulnerability—in the words of Dr. Johnson, nothing so wonderfully concentrates a man's thoughts as the prospect of imminent hanging—the British ruling class realizes that the capitalist system as a whole and British capitalism in particular would be committing suicide in undertaking a head-on collision with the socialist world.

Third, the fact that the "Colossus of the North" is not as strong as he appeared to be and that the socialist bloc is stronger than it was formerly fashionable to admit, has given the timorous and cautious British bourgeoisie the courage to speak out and to take a relatively independent stand. This came out most clearly in the speech of the Tory maverick Boothby in the House debate on foreign affairs on June 23. "Truth to tell, American policy during these weeks has not been very helpful. . . . They [the Americans] did not really like the Geneva Conference at all. . . . [There are] doubts as to whether the Americans want a peaceful settlement of any kind. . . . There is no chance, under existing conditions, of organizing a world front for a preventive war against China." And last, and most conclusive, "we are no longer negotiating this affair from strength." The point may sound trivial, but it is instructive to contrast the language of Bevin a few years ago with that of Attlee

today. Bevin spoke to America as a wheedling supplicant. Attlee now dares to point out defects in the American Constitution.

This factor is undoubtedly double-edged. The British ruling class does not want America to be too weak in relation to Russia. But neither does it want America to be so powerful in relation to the rest of the world as to be able to be indifferent to British imperialist interests and influence, and the recent revelation that there are definite limits to America's ability to shape the world to its mold has undeniably been welcome. The ideal position for the British fox is to be able to use its relations with Russia and China as a bargaining counter with the American eagle, and its relations with America as a bargaining counter with Russia and China.

But there are grave difficulties in the way of attaining, let alone maintaining, this ideal position. On the one hand, while Britain's bargaining power is apparently at a maximum as long as America refuses to normalize its relations with Russia and China, the danger of war is ever-present in the absence of such normalization. On the other hand, if America comes to its senses, British *imperialist* bargaining power will be substantially reduced, although the advantages *to the British people* from the recession of the war danger are simply not to be compared with any loss to British *imperialist* freedom of maneuver (which in any case is purely temporary in character: there is no future in standing in the middle of a violently fluctuating see-saw).

Having recorded the emergence of an open cleavage between Britain and the United States, which is an unequivocal net gain for the cause of world peace, we must hasten to add that *there is no sign of any imminent disintegration of the Anglo-American Alliance*. It still remains the cornerstone of British foreign policy and is officially endorsed as such by both the Conservative and Labor Parties. True, there are divisions of opinion within as well as between the two parties. As we have seen, one sector of the Tory party bitterly opposes American encroachments on British imperialist spheres of influence. Another and larger sector is unhappy about any differences with Washington. Churchill and Eden, as the most intelligent members of the most intelligent capitalist ruling class in the world, are desperately endeavoring to hang on to what is left without being drawn into a universal conflagration. But when and if it comes to a showdown, there can be little doubt that the Tory party, the classic party of appeasement, will yield to American pressure. It is significant that Eden's recent speeches in the House of Commons were more warmly applauded by Labor than by his own back benches, and that Churchill in his desire to minimize Anglo-American differences has already come perilously close to appeasement. It would be

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one of the ironies of history if the Churchill of the fifties should play the role of the Chamberlain of the thirties, and if it should fall to the lot of Aneurin Bevan to take the part of the Churchill of the thirties!

It is within the Labor Party, as might be expected, that the most striking changes of attitude towards the Anglo-American Alliance have occurred. These changes are much too important to be summarized in a concluding paragraph, and in any case it will be more appropriate to review them after the Scarborough Conference of the Labor Party. Suffice to say at this time that the appointment of an *official* Party delegation to visit China reflects the will of the rank and file; that the further one moves to the Left, the stronger one finds the desire for greater independence from the United States; and that, despite press reports to the contrary, the Center and Left—within the trade unions as well as in the constituencies—are gaining ground every day. On the issue of German rearmament they command the overwhelming majority of the party, and their chances of successfully reversing the Executive's premature stand in favor of German rearmament appear most favorable at the time of writing.

This is not to underestimate Attlee's capacity for veering and turning in critical situations. Attlee's purely technical talents as a politician are of the highest order, certainly not less than Churchill's. It must never be forgotten that Britain has produced the ablest right-wing Social Democratic leadership in the world, which has so far managed to blunt and deaden the edge of popular feeling on crucial issues. Whether or not it will be able to thwart the popular will to peace and resistance to American hegemony is another and by no means settled question.

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*The concentration of every man on his own interests has been the danger and not the safety of Democracy; for Democracy contemplates that every man shall think first of the State and next of himself. This is its only justification. In so far as it is operated by men who are thinking first of their own interests and then of the State, its operation is distorted.*

—John Jay Chapman, *Causes and Consequences*

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*This man is an optimist. It means that he has struggled. That man is a pessimist. It means that he has shirked.*

—John Jay Chapman, *Causes and Consequences*

## TWO VIEWS ON THE WITCH HUNT

Among many statements on the witch hunt, two impressed us as particularly eloquent and cogent. On November 2, 1953, the General Council of the Presbyterian Church addressed a letter to all members of the Church. And on November 24, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas spoke in Philadelphia before the Friends Committee on National Legislation. We reprint here excerpts from these two statements: they should be useful to all MR readers.—THE EDITORS

### *From the Presbyterian Letter*

Under the plea that the structure of American society is in imminent peril of being shattered by a satanic conspiracy, dangerous developments are taking place in our national life. Favored by an atmosphere of intense disquiet and suspicion, a subtle but potent assault upon basic human rights is now in progress. Some congressional inquiries have revealed a distinct tendency to become inquisitions. These inquisitions, which find their historic pattern in medieval Spain and in the tribunals of modern totalitarian states, begin to constitute a threat to freedom of thought in this country. Treason and dissent are being confused. The shrine of conscience and private judgment, which God alone has a right to enter, is being invaded. Un-American attitudes toward ideas and books are becoming current. Attacks are being made upon citizens of integrity and social passion which are utterly alien to our democratic tradition. They are particularly alien to the Protestant religious tradition which has been a main source of the freedoms which the people of the United States enjoy.

There is something still more serious. A great many people, within and without our Government, approach the problem of Communism in a purely negative way. Communism, which is at bottom a secular religious faith of great vitality, is thus being dealt with as an exclusively police problem. As a result of this there is growing up over against Communism a fanatical negativism. Totally devoid of a constructive program of action, this negativism is in danger of leading the American mind into a spiritual vacuum. Our national house, cleansed of one demon, would invite by its very emptiness, the entrance of seven others. In the case of a national crisis this emptiness could, in the high-sounding name of security, be occupied with ease by a fascist tyranny.

### *From Justice Douglas' Speech*

We are condemning men and women on the basis of hearsay,

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innuendo, and guilt by association. We do not, of course, take this short cut to send people to death. But we use it for purposes almost as devastating—to ruin the reputations of citizens and to deprive them of their livelihoods.

We put a cloak of anonymity over a growing underground of informers. Men are adjudged on the whispered accusations of faceless people not known to the accused.

Reports whose sources are kept secret and never disclosed are used publicly to condemn and destroy people.

The privacy of the home is increasingly invaded by wire tappers whose footsteps are never heard, who do not unlock a door but who search the place as effectively as though they were present in person.

A Communist, one with Communist affiliations, one with leftist tendencies, a socialist, a liberal, or just a plain Yankee who does not like this business of the witch hunt and who shouts his protest—these are all put in the same classification.

Anxieties and suspicions are aroused until a community does not know what to believe or whom to trust, until even old neighbors suspect one another. More and more people conclude that the only safe thing to do is to conform: either to stand silent or to join the hunt.

Many of these practices have unfortunately been held to be within the letter of the law. But even when lawyers and judges justify them, they violate, I submit, the ideals of freedom which we profess. They repudiate the standards of decency, fair play, and tolerance which are the fundamentals of our tradition.

The moving declaration on the "Dignity of Man" made by the Roman Catholic Bishops the other day, the ringing reaffirmation of the rights of man issued by the General Council of the Presbyterian Church a few weeks ago, the Quakers' recent plea for freedom of conscience and liberty under law—these are the true articles of the American faith. And though the law may not always reflect those principles, it will in time respond to them. Merchants of hate do not represent the conscience, the soul, the tolerance of Americans, our faith in the dignity of man, our belief in fair play. Any witch hunt bothers the conscience of America. That is why our people will soon have done with these short cuts and not let the fever of passion and distrust possess us for long.

Meanwhile this decline in our respect for the Bill of Rights at home is having serious effect both abroad and at home. It is making us suspect abroad. At home it is depriving us of the perspective, the balance, the wisdom, and the tolerance that are necessary if we are to help enlist the peoples of the world on the democratic front and work with them in the cause of peace.





I KNOW ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ABOUT THE CASE...I'M JUST  
HERE TO HELP FRAME THE DEFENDANT...

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*Governments need and have ample power to punish treasonable acts, but it does not follow that they must have a further power to punish thought and speech as distinguished from acts. . . . And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.*

—Mr. Justice Black, concurring opinion in unanimous decision of Supreme Court in Oklahoma Loyalty Oath Case, December 12, 1952

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*Ours is an age which is proud of machines that think but afraid of people who do.*

—H. P. G.

## **WORLD EVENTS**

*By Scott Nearing*

### **Who Leads the World?**

Every United States schoolboy and most members of Congress know the stock answer to the above question: America! President Eisenhower stated it baldly in his inaugural message of January 20, 1953: "Destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility for world leadership." To the Newspaper Publishers Association on April 22, 1954, the President said: "History has decreed that responsibility of leadership shall be placed on this nation." Secretary Dulles in the policy statements following his speeches of December 14, 1953, in Paris and December 22, 1953, in Washington asserted that if the world did not answer this important question of world leadership to Washington's satisfaction there was to be instantaneous and massive retaliation. The Eisenhower-Dulles program calls for United States world leadership — with bombs.

This bluff-bluster-and-bomb line of Secretary Dulles, Chief of Staff Radford, Vice President Nixon and Senator Knowland has been tested once more by the sweep of world events. This time the theater of action was Indo-China, but repercussions were felt in every center of the power-politics struggle.

The issue arose after Vietminh forces had captured Dienbienphu. Should the western world fight the victorious Vietminh government or negotiate? Dulles-Radford-Nixon-Knowland and a host of their jingoist followers said "Fight!" Paris, Moscow, Peking, and London said "Negotiate!" The negotiators won the day.

So sure of themselves were the massive retaliators that they presented Paris and London with a virtual ultimatum: "You fight or we pull out." Secretary Dulles did pull out of Geneva after taking a perfunctory part in the opening ceremonies of the Conference. He said, in effect—"We own the ball, the bat, and the catcher's mitt. We are taking our toys home with us so that there can be no game"—whereupon he and his Under Secretary of State, General Smith, walked out on the Geneva Conference. Foreign Ministers Eden, Molotov, and Chou stayed on the job. After two months of painstaking negotiation, the Geneva Conference, with United States top negotiators absent for most of the time, brought to an end the seven-year war in Indo-China.

Not only were United States leading diplomats absent from Geneva, but Secretary Dulles and State Department spokesmen repeatedly predicted the failure of the conference because of Russian and Chinese bad faith. After seven weeks when it was evident that the Geneva Conference was going to arrange a cease-fire in Indo-China, Under Secretary Smith returned to Geneva and Secretary Dulles flew to Paris. The power-politics game had gone on quite effectively in the absence of United States leadership.

The United States did not lead the world either at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers or at the subsequent Conference on South-East Asia at Geneva. By every means at its command, short of armed violence, Washington did its utmost to cripple the conference in Berlin and to torpedo that in Geneva. In both instances, Washington failed ignominiously.

The United States is far ahead of its rivals in productive power and wealth. Presumably it is better armed than any other nation, since its annual bill for armament tops the list. Despite its economic ascendancy and its superior fire-power, however, the United States does not lead. Instead, Washington spokesmen harangue, denounce, threaten, subsidize petty dictators in Spain, Greece, Formosa, and South Korea, bully their weaker satellites, foment insurrections against governments which resist their domination, lecture their rivals, blackmail their dependents by threatening to withhold economic and military subsidies, and where they cannot have things their way, walk out on the discussion. Such activities may be described as sabotage, cloak-and-dagger diplomacy, or international gangsterism. By no distortion of the English language can they be called leadership.

Who *does* lead the world? No one nation, at the moment. Actually there are five top-ranking world powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and India. Three of these powers — Britain, the Soviet Union, and China — held the balance in Geneva and brought the conference to a successful conclusion. India supported the negotiators. Only the United States was openly hostile to the Geneva effort at finding a nonmilitary solution to the threat of general war. The United States was outmaneuvered and isolated. Eden, Molotov, and Chou held the field and won the day.

Geneva illustrated and demonstrated the precarious balance of world economic and political power, as between the Big Five. It showed up the arrogance and ignorance of those who assert that America leads the world. It provided one more bit of evidence to support the contention that the balance of world power is tipping away from the West toward the East, away from Europe and North America toward China, Soviet Central Asia, Siberia, and India.

## Britain Carries On

Uncertainty, anxiety, and fear have the United States by the throat. The Army-McCarthy controversy was one outcome of this mass hysteria. Another result was described before the National Education Association meeting in New York City on June 27, 1954, by Dr. Martin Essex, Superintendent of Schools at Lakewood, Ohio, and Chairman of the Association's Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom. Dr. Essex warned that teachers in many communities were afraid to discuss controversial issues in the classroom, or to make any stand in public that might reflect on their loyalty to the established social system. As a result, "Our education is in danger of becoming fossilized, a dry mass of facts, lacking vitality or meaning." (*New York Times*, June 28, 1954.)

It is relaxing and refreshing to turn from the witch-hunt tensions of the United States to a people that, despite severe losses and serious impending dangers, has kept its balance, preserved its good temper, and retained its long-established pattern of tolerance and freedom under law.

An American visiting Great Britain at the present time is impressed by the absence of fear or hysteria. Britons are neither tense nor over-excited. They go about their affairs in their usual matter-of-fact way. Certainly they are not afraid of each other. Spy scares are non-existent. Yes, of course there are Communists in industry, in trade unions, and in the government service. But no one believes that 50 million Britons, who held back the Nazi hosts single-handed in 1940, can be challenged by a few thousand Communists.

Is Britain afraid of the Soviet Union? Hardly! Soviet orders for ships, tools, and textiles are pouring into the British Isles. These orders are backed by Soviet gold—tens of millions of dollars worth—flown to London and deposited in the Bank of England. There have been times when Britain and Russia have fought against each other. The last big tussle was in the Crimea a century ago. It was a tough fight, but the British held up their end. Is there any reason to suppose that they cannot do as well again?

Anyway, why should they fight the Russians? As long as the Bolshies stay home, minding their own business, and are willing to carry on two-way trade, why should not the British do likewise?

Almost every day Britons go to the Soviet Union and Soviet citizens visit Britain. Businessmen, labor men, artists, and intellectuals return from Russia with the same report: "The people over there want peace while they try their hand at building a socialist society. As long as they do not interfere with us, can't we live and let live?"

So the British talk and so they act, taking life as it comes and facing the future calmly. They got a bitter taste of war from 1939 to 1945 and they want no more of it. Still, if war comes, they will fight. There are as few pacifists in the British Isles as there are in the United States.

Three things concern the intelligent Briton ("worry" is too strong a word for his feeling). First, the possibility that the United States State Department may insist on fighting a war against Asia. This issue came up in 1950 when General MacArthur moved up to the Yalu River. It came up again when President Truman suggested the use of atomic weapons in Korea. It has come up once again in the Dulles idea of instant and massive retaliation and in Vice President Nixon's assertions that the Communists could not be allowed to win in Indo-China. If the Indo-Chinese want to go Communist, say the British, that is their affair.

Second, and along the same line, the British believe that China should be recognized and allowed to take its seat in the United Nations, that Britain and other Western European countries should go on trading with the Far East, especially China, as they have done for centuries.

The third British concern is with witch-hunting, book-burning, neighborhood spying, and rough-and-tumble legislative inquisitions into the ideas and associations of citizens. The British, always well-mannered, have no idea of interfering in the domestic affairs of the United States, but they are uneasy because similar activities in Germany twenty years ago led into a world-wide war. If there is one thing the British dread, it is another general war in which the British Isles, because of their position off the coast of Europe, will be an immediate target for atom and hydrogen bombs.

Having such concerns, the British view their American cousins with a mixture of incredulity and mild alarm. "Have they gone crazy over there?" they ask. No one feels quite safe while an armed lunatic is at large.

British pressure at the March meeting of Foreign Ministers in Berlin was partly responsible for the Geneva Conference. British pressure took United States Administrator Stassen to Britain for a discussion that eased restrictions on East-West trade. British insistence postponed the organization of a South East Asia anti-Communist bloc until after the Geneva Conference. British persistence was a large factor in continuing the Geneva negotiations until the Indo-China armistice was arranged.

Britain, at the moment, wants stability, security, and a breathing spell. The British are supported in this position by Canada, France, and the Soviet Union. Under existing conditions, they may cast the

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deciding vote against "instantaneous retaliation" and the launching of a hydrogen bomb war, and in favor of world order and peace.

### Clement Attlee on Aggression in Guatemala

While *United States News & World Report* was shouting in red letters across its front cover "Soviets Cross the Atlantic. The Inside Story of Russian-Directed Operations in Guatemala" (July 9, 1954), Clement Attlee, leader of the British Labor Party, was offering the House of Commons his version of the Guatemala affair:

This small state was warned that an attack was imminent from neighboring states. It sought to get arms. Those arms were denied it. Arms went into the neighboring states. It turned out that its apprehension was correct. It was attacked from neighboring states. It was overrun and a new Government was installed.

I hold no brief for the Guatemalan Government. I do not know whether it was Communist or partly Communist. . . . The fact is that this was a plain matter of aggression, and one cannot take one line on aggression in Asia and another line in Central America.

I confess that I was rather shocked at the joy and approval of the American Secretary of State at the success of this putsch. It is quite easy to say that these were Communists but our laws do not allow one to assault a person because one does not like his opinion. . . .

It is serious because we cannot pass this off as just a Central American squabble, of which there are so many. There was a principle involved, and that principle was the responsibility of the United Nations. I think it was a mistake in those circumstances to try to hand it over to a regional body. . . . I am afraid that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant taste in one's mouth because, to illustrate the theme I was putting, it seems in some instance that the acceptance of the principles of the United Nations is subordinated to a hatred of Communism.

Probably the Attlee version of the Rape of Guatemala is also the Churchill version, although Churchill, limited by diplomatic niceties, is not in a position to speak his mind. Certainly it is the version most widely accepted in Asia and in Latin America. In a word, Attlee speaks for the world, while *U.S. News* shouts for the United States oligarchy and their State Department.

Whatever Mr. Attlee may say or what Asia and Latin America may think, four facts about Guatemala seem incontrovertible: (1) Guatemala was for many years a part of the Banana Empire dominated by United Fruit Company. (2) The economics and politics of

Guatemala were managed, not by Guatemalans, for their general welfare, but by a foreign financial interest, for its profit. (3) Ten years ago Guatemalans voted in a regime which set out to provide land for tenant farmers and to free the country from Banana Imperialism. (4) In 1954, Secretary Dulles declared war on Guatemala at the Caracas All-American Conference, the country was invaded by well armed and equipped military forces, the duly elected government was overthrown, and a military dictatorship was set up. In this coup the United States Ambassador to Guatemala publicly played a leading anti-government role, and throughout the invasion the State Department expressed satisfaction to the point of jubilation. Immediately after the invasion, aid was sent by Washington to the new government and it was diplomatically recognized. These acts of assistance and approval associated the State Department with aggression and violence.

Clement Attlee remarked that the laws of Britain "do not allow one to assault a person because one does not like his opinion." Guatemala is another proof that Washington's policy permits, encourages, and assists the violent overthrow of governments which persist in opposing State Department policy.

### Learning the Hard Way in Indo-China

Indo-China is a school-of-hard-knocks in which France and other Western aggressor nations have been learning the mid-twentieth century cost of trying to push Asians around. A hundred years ago, the French began to edge, crowd, buy, maneuver, and fight their way into Indo-China. On July 21, 1954, top French officials signed an agreement to end the seven-year Indo-China War on terms that recognized the Indo-China "rebels" and legalized their control of Northern Vietnam.

Southern Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have won their independence. Consequently, decisions concerning the economic, political, and social affairs of Indo-China, which have been made in Paris for generations, henceforth will be made in the four capital cities of a territory which, until recently, has been referred to as "French" Indo-China.

Great Britain pulled out of "British" India in 1947, as gracefully as possible, under the strong Indian drive for independence and self-government. France, at the same time, elected to stay and fight it out in Indo-China. The decision led to a war which has drained the French Treasury, exhausted French manpower, built up a wall of anti-French sentiment in Asia, and made France an economic and political dependency of Washington.

British policy makers were wise enough, after 1945, to realize

that the revolutions sweeping over Asia must follow their own paths. French leaders, less perceptive and adaptable, decided to beat the Indo-Chinese into submission. The resulting defeats and disasters all but wiped out French power in Asia and seriously undermined it in North Africa. British imperialists saw the storm coming and ducked. Their French counterparts braved the tempest and lost their shirts.

## IRELAND AND THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION: A COMMUNICATION

BY ANDREW BOYD

The hollow hypocrisy and sham democratic phraseology of the Churchill-Eisenhower Washington Declaration has, of course, been brutally exposed to the world by the events in Guatemala. But Ireland too, though far from being under the influence of Communists, has challenged the sincerity of this Declaration. Clause Three (which contains the words, "In the case of nations divided against their will we shall seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to ensure they are conducted fairly") has been discussed in the British House of Commons. On July 13th, Mr. Cahir Healy, Irish Nationalist M.P. for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (part of the area which Britain controls), asked Sir Winston Churchill if the case of Ireland was discussed by himself and President Eisenhower before they signed the statement on the principle of the unification of countries whose people desire it.

To this Churchill replied that the case of Ireland was not discussed and he added, rather inanely and to the accompaniment of laughter from the Tory side of the House, "I thought that was all settled happily a long time ago."

Mr. Healy then asked, "Do you not consider that Clause Three fits the case of Ireland like a glove? . . . Are the principles of democracy to be applied only to nations abroad?"

*Andrew Boyd is the author of "Nationalism and Labor in Ireland," MR, October and November, 1953.*



## IRELAND AND THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION

After an embarrassing silence, during which he was repeatedly called upon to answer, Churchill replied, "The principles of democracy, subject to their usual qualifications, are of general application."

The Irish Republican and anti-Partition movements have seized upon the Washington Declaration to expose the insincerity of its authors. Did President Eisenhower, they ask, secretly agree with Sir Winston Churchill that their joint declaration should *not* apply to Ireland? If so, can a secret agreement which directly contradicts the published statement be defended? Or if there was no question of excluding Ireland, and if the declaration meant what it said, without any secret reservations, does President Eisenhower now accept Sir Winston's vital alteration of the President's words? If President Eisenhower does not accept Sir Winston's amendment of his words, he may feel bound in honor to say so.

To public opinion in Ireland, therefore, it seems that the Washington Declaration applies only where the British and American governments want it to apply, and is intended only for those countries in Asia and Eastern Europe where the people have been able to wrest part, at least, of their homelands from the menace of western imperialism.

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### WHICH PART?

*It is the British belief that Ho Chi Minh and his rebels have strong popular support in the nation and that this support is increasing steadily. For weeks Foreign Office officials have emphasized that in any free election in Vietnam it is probable the Communists would win easily.*

*Under these circumstances, the best the free world can hope to get in Indochina is a partition that would leave part of the nation free.*

—New York Times, July 9, 1954

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*Come on McCarthy, whet your sword.  
You know you're working for the lord.  
And if your labors bring some dough,  
Why shouldn't it belong to Joe?*

—Veni Vidi

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(continued from inside front cover)

fied the McCarthy Committee a year ago), and your response has been heartening. Let us urge those of you who have not yet contributed to do so as soon and as liberally as you can afford to. Every cent will be used to help get the First Amendment put back into the Constitution. Please make checks payable to Leo Huberman.

After the New Hampshire court decision in the Sweezy Case had been made public, we received the following letter from Scott Nearing which we want to share with MR readers:

It seems in keeping that both editors of an independent socialist magazine should be picked on by the oligarchs. And it is gratifying to the rest of us that both have stood their ground.

There is a real opening in the United States for those who believe in a socialist society to say so out loud and to keep on saying it publicly, standing the consequences. There is a goodly segment of the American populace who take seriously the expression of opinion on public questions.

It is inconvenient and annoying to have to deal with the oligarchs or their apologists. But the other possibilities are to keep silent or else to move, and we can do neither.

And speaking of Scott Nearing, let us call your attention to the series of lectures which he will deliver in New York in the fall. This is a wonderful opportunity for all New York-area subscribers to study with one of the great American teachers of our generation. Details on page 192.

Along with hundreds of thousands of others throughout the country, we mourn the death of our good friend Vito Marcantonio. All politicians represent their constituencies in a very real sense, but most of them represent primarily the wealthy and influential upper strata. Marc, almost alone among American politicians in this era of rampant reaction, represented and fought tirelessly for the interests of the poor, the downtrodden, the underprivileged of his district. His latest reward was defeat at the hands of a Democratic-Republican coalition, ostensibly devoted to exorcising the red menace but actually concerned with preserving intact a system which enables the rich to live off the sweat of the poor. It is a tragedy for the whole American Left that Marc should have died in the midst of a gallant comeback effort which we believe had every prospect of succeeding.

In a way it is ironical that Marc should have been so vociferously denounced as a Communist. In fact, he was the most optimistic of New Dealers. The last evening we spent with him, some time ago now, was largely taken up with a friendly argument over how much could be accomplished by New Deal-type measures within the framework of capitalism, and we could only conclude that Marc was unrealistically sanguine. But that did not prevent us from agreeing with him on what needs to be done in the next five or ten years, and we are confident that in the long run he would have agreed with us on the necessity of socialism.

Let us close with this personal tribute to Marc from another good friend of ours, Professor H. H. Wilson of Princeton:

It was a shock to learn that Vito Marcantonio died today. I didn't know him well but had spent a few hours with him and found him a thoroughly decent and attractive guy. He did a brilliant job before a seminar of mine on parliamentary procedure, and I planned to invite him many more times.

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